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Abstract 
The primary focus of corruption studies and anti-corruption activism has been corruption within sovereign 
states. However, over the last twenty years ‘globalization’, the flow of money, goods, people and ideas 
across borders, has threatened to overwhelm the system of sovereign states. Much activity has moved 
outside the control of nation states at the same time as nation states have ‘deregulated’ and in so doing have 
transferred power from those exercising governmental power at the nominal behest of the majority of its 
citizens to those with greater wealth and/or greater knowledge in markets in which knowledge is typically 
asymmetric. 
 
It is now recognized that many governance problems have arisen because of globalisation and can only be 
addressed by global solutions. It must also be recognized that governance problems at the national level 
contribute to governance problems and the global level and vice versa. Nevertheless, many of the lessons 
learned in combating corruption at the national level are relevant to a globalized world – in particular, the 
need for ethics and leadership in addition to legal and institutional reform; the need to integrate these 
measures into integrity systems; and the awareness of corruption systems. These are applied to areas of 
concern within sustainable globalisation raised by the conference – including peace and security, extractive 
industries, climate change and sustainable banking. 
 
Introduction 
For the last two decades, the primary focus of corruption studies and anti-corruption activism has been 
corruption within sovereign states. International activism was largely directed at co-ordinating national 
campaigns and to use international instruments to make them more effective domestically. This reflects the 
broader fact that, since the rise of the nation state,1 states have comprised most of the largest institutional 
actors and have been the most significant institution in the lives of most individuals. This made states the 
‘main game in town’ for the ‘governance disciplines’ – lawyers, political scientists, economists and ethicists.2   
 
However, over the last twenty years, the flow of money, goods, people and ideas across borders has 
threatened to overwhelm the system of sovereign states. Much activity has moved outside the control of 
nation states at the same time as nation states have ‘deregulated’ and in so doing have transferred power 
from those exercising governmental power at the nominal behest of the majority of its citizens to those with 
greater wealth and/or greater knowledge in markets in which knowledge is typically asymmetric. 
 
It is now recognized that many governance problems have arisen because of globalisation and can only be 
addressed by global solutions. It must also be recognized that governance problems at the national level 
contribute to governance problems and the global level and vice versa. This is true of current issues from the 
melting Greenland glaciers to the ethical and financial meltdown of Wall St. It is also true of traditional issues 
involving interlinked domestic and international conflict and the toxic symbiosis of foreigners paying bribes to 
officials which are deposited in off shore secretive banks.  
 
A. Learning lessons from the fight against corruption within sovereign states 
However, before addressing those global problems and potential global solutions, it is useful to quickly 
review some of the progress in thinking about the nature of corruption within sovereign states and the best 
means of combating it.  
 
Westphalian states, absolute power and the enlightenment 
The strong sovereign nation-states that emerged from the chaos of the thirty years war (1618-48) in 
seventeenth century Europe were generally highly authoritarian and justified as such. Hobbes (the 
‘philosopher of record’?) argued that rational people would mutually agree to subject themselves to an all-
powerful sovereign to avoid a ‘state of nature’ in which the life of man would be ‘poor, nasty, brutish and 
short’.3  It was better to allow a sovereign to enforce his preferred religion and for those who did not like it to 
leave than to allow other sovereigns to intervene on behalf of their co-religionists.4  Once internal order had 
been restored, this ‘social contract’ did not seem such a good bargain. While sovereigns were entrusted with 
absolute power to preserve social order, such power was a recipe for corruption for reasons set out clearly 
by Lord Acton’s aphorism that ‘power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely’. The eighteenth 
century Enlightenment sought to civilize these authoritarian states by holding them to a set of more refined 
and ambitious values – notably liberty, equality, citizenship, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. 
Some of these were adaptations of classical city state ideals to the much larger polities of the time. 
Nineteenth century thinkers extended the range of rights championed and added concern for environment 
and for practical and social equality. By the mid-twentieth century, disputes had moved on to the 
interpretation and ranking of those rights – especially between civil and political rights and social and 
economic rights. 
 
Values are rarely self-implementing: they require institutions to realize them. Institutional innovations 
included an independent judiciary exercising judicial review of the executive, representative institutions, 
bicameral parliaments, federal division of functions, universal education, questioning media and ‘responsible’ 
(or ‘parliamentary’) government. This development of governance values and the institutions to realize them 
can be seen as an ‘enlightenment project’. 
 
Modern developments 
While the adoption and institutionalisation of liberal democratic and social democratic values spread and 
many of the relevant values were enshrined in international instruments, the concentration of power within 
states provided a temptation to corruption. Various scandals demonstrated that democratic polities could be 
highly corrupt – and not all states were democracies. More was required and two models emerged. 
1. Twenty years ago, the Hong Kong model (a strong law and a powerful agency) was the general model 
for fighting corruption. Since then, preference shifted to ‘national integrity systems’ (NIS) in which several 
institutions, agencies and laws sought to simultaneously promote integrity and limit corruption. 
2. The choice of the term ‘integrity system’ rather than ‘anti-corruption’ system was inspired. Corruption (the 
abuse of entrusted power for personal gain) is a derivative concept and a derivative goal. One cannot 
know what an abuse is without knowing what the legitimate uses of those powers are. Integrity (the use 
of entrusted power for publicly justified ends) is primary. We want effective institutions that deliver a 
sufficient proportion of their promises. If all we just wanted to avoid government corruption that goal 
could be achieved in theory by not having government and in practice from anti-corruption practices that 
prevented the government doing anything.  
3. ‘Personal’ gain is very widely construed. It extends beyond personal enrichment and includes benefits to 
the power holder’s family, associates, political party5 – indeed anyone other than those who are the 
publicly intended beneficiaries of that power.  
4. The potential for corruption is built into all institutions because of the dynamics of collective action and 
agency. The reason why we create and support governments, joint stock companies – and international 
NGOs – is because so often more can be achieved collectively than individually with the pooling of 
people power and resources for shared goals. However, that opens the possibility that institutional 
leaders may turn that entrusted power to their own benefit or use against their 
citizens/stockholders/bondholders. While it is not true that all power corrupts, it has to be recognized that 
it will not only attract those who wish to exercise it for its publicly justified purpose but also those who 
wish to use it for their own purposes. 
5. A NIS evolves to increase the probability that entrusted powers will be used for its publicly justified and 
democratically endorsed ends and reduce the likelihood that those powers are abused.  
6. NIS will vary from state to state with similar functions being performed by different institutions. A NIS can 
vary in completeness and effectiveness, but there is almost always some base on which it can be built.  
7. Anti-corruption reforms have concentrated on new laws and institutions.  
Ethics and leadership have been the missing elements of governance reform.  
8. Ethics articulates and applies the values which lie at the base of the NIS to the ends that institutions may 
serve and the norms that will guide officials who seek to act with integrity in serving them. 
9. Coalitions of leaders are needed to create, reinforce and integrate the institutions of the NIS and to co-
ordinate their activities. (This was a major conclusion of the first World Ethics Forum held in Oxford in 
2006.) 
10. While a NIS may be seen as the best way to promote integrity, the corrupt are often far more organized 
and in some states corruption systems (NCS) may be better organized, better resourced and more 
effective – with long established patterns of behaviour, strong institutions, clear norms and effective 
positive and negative sanctions. The NCS will seek to disrupt and corrupt the NIS. As a corollary, the 
NIS should return the favour. It should not merely seek to deter, detect and prosecute bribe givers and 
bribe takers but should first set to map and understand the corruption system then plan how to disrupt 
and destroy it.  
 
Lessons learned 
The first lesson is that corruption does matter. Corruption is not a minor issue, let alone a sustainable 
alternative route to development. Corruption is linked to the failure of states to achieve the goals they set 
themselves for the very simple reason that the power, people and resources allocated to achieving those 
goals are used for other purposes.  The second lesson is the approach to be taken in combating corruption. 
If corruption involves the abuse of entrusted power for personal gain, the attempt to limit corruption in an 
emerging global order involves identifying: 
1. areas of significant power 
2. the ostensible purpose (the claimed purposes that are used to publicly justify the existence of that power 
and the ends for which it may be legitimately used) 
3. potential abuses of that power by those who hold it and the benefits they and others will gain from them 
4. potential corruption systems that may emerge to organize those abuses of power 
5. potential integrity systems that disrupt corruption systems and increase the likelihood that power are 
used for their ostensible purpose not abused for other purposes. 
This paper uses this approach to frame discussion on sustainable globalisation and the particular issues 
covered by the conference. 
 
B. Identify and develop relevant global values 
What are the values that will inform sustainable global governance, form the base of a potential global 
integrity system and inform the ethical decisions of officials of multi-lateral, trans-national and global 
institutions? Put simply: what values should sustainable globalization seek to sustain? 
1. Arguably there is a strong parallel to the 18th century when the ‘Enlightenment’ sought to civilize the 
highly authoritarian states that emerged after the Treaty of Westphalia with a set of liberal-democratic 
values followed by social-democratic values in the 19th and 20th centuries. The untamed and rather brutal 
partly globalized world might be seen to need a new ‘global enlightenment’.  
2. The source of those values should not be limited to western countries – it needs to be truly global, taking 
in the insights to governance values provided by all cultures. In so doing, we need to avoid the traps of 
cultural relativism and over-ambitious claims of universal values. While similar values can be found in all 
cultures and in the writings of Confucius, Buddha, Christ and Mohamad, they can only be called 
universal at levels of abstraction that are not particularly helpful and deny the very real philosophical 
development that has taken place between and since those to whom the relevant writings have been 
attributed. Truly universal values may appear at the asymptote of infinite dialogue but not before. What 
can be found is ‘congruent values’, values with similar meaning and effect that are nonetheless subtly 
different because of the different histories and contexts in which they arose. These form a much stronger 
base on which to form global values which can inform global governance.  
3. Good governance and bad governance are not the preserve of any particular culture. All long standing 
cultures, religions and traditions have experienced good governance and bad governance (the West 
managed to produce both Nazism and Bolshevism in a single century as well as some of the finest 
articulations of human rights, democracy and the rule of law – generally by those like Gandhi and Dr 
King who were acutely aware that the values were ‘good ideas’ that still needed to be put into practice).  
4. Global values may well emerge as versions of good governance values proposed for nation states 
including: 
a. Transparency, Rule of Law, Liberty and Human Rights may translate fairly directly from 
sovereign state to global community (see comments on Transparency in Glossary). 
b. Equality is a highly contested value within sovereign states with some emphasising formal 
equality and others advocating substantive equality along at least some dimensions. This 
becomes all the more complicated when dealing with differences across states as well as within 
them.  
c. Citizenship and Democracy will require the most work. These ideas were developed in city 
states and changed significantly when they were applied to sovereign states. Their application to 
the institutions found in a globalising world are likely to involve further significant development – 
perhaps embracing claims to membership of, and a say in, the critical institutions that affect 
lives. When sovereign states were the ‘only game in town, claims to membership and say 
centred on sovereign states. They may now legitimately extend to international agencies and 
corporations. 
d. Accountability might not change much as a concept – the key issue is who is to be accountable 
to whom and for what? 
e. Environmental values were developed within sovereign states. In 19th century England, they led 
to the formation of the National Trust and attempts to clean up the Thames. These values are 
now global. 
5. Some of these are process values – transparency, rule of law and accountability. 
6. Some are substantive values – human rights and liberties, citizenship and environmental values. 
7. One of the key value questions is whether the millennium development goals (MDGs) are a sufficient 
and balanced reflection of the needs of the world’s poorest. 
 
C. Institutionalizing these values 
The next question at national and global levels is how we can institutionalize these values – i.e. what 
institutions will best realize those values? It is argued that this will not be through global government – ‘the 
sovereign state writ large’. The answer lies in global governance – a range of institutions to achieve these 
values. This requires: 
1. Clarity as to the values/public goods the institutions are expected to achieve. 
2. The creation of a set of institutions that can realize global values. Some of those institutions will already 
be established, some will need major reform and some new institutions will have to be created. These 
will include the UN which, for all its faults, it is the only one we will ever get. While its faults are many, it 
should be recognized that the UN and its agencies have been remarkably successful in putting a floor 
under human misery caused by war, famine and pestilence.  
3. However, we should not expect the UN to be a ‘sovereign state writ large’. What is true at the national 
level is even more true at the global level: promoting integrity and combating corruption require a range 
of institutions – multi-lateral, national, corporate and not-for-profit (NGO/CSO).  
4. Recognize that the power, people and resources that are invested in these organisations will create 
agency problems > potential for abuse. 
5. The creation of institutional integrity systems to make it more likely that those values are realized by the 
relevant institutions. 
6. Recognition that the global integrity system involves many institutions and those institutions will need 
coalitions of leaders to create, develop and lead them 
7. The creation of a global integrity system – starting with global institutions (such as the UN and World 
Bank) and moving to international system more generally (which includes nation states, multi-national 
corporations and international NGOs): 
a. Just like national integrity systems, it will not be built to a single plan but built up gradually, 
starting with what we have. 
b. Recognize the impediments to achieving those values and that it is necessary to build 
mechanisms to deal with those impediments into the global integrity system. 
8. Sustainable globalisation requires sustainable global governance. If the powers entrusted to global 
institutions (multilateral agencies, multinational companies and international NGOs) are abused for 
personal or narrow state-based aims, global governance will break down. The GIS, similar to the NIS 
needs to be designed to ensure that those powers are used for the purposes which justify those powers 
rather than abused. In this sense, the GIS > sustainable global governance > sustainable globalisation. 
 
D. Recognizing the role of individuals in dealing with these global issues   
While the architecture of sustainable global governance and sustainable globalisation is largely institutional, 
we should never ignore the individual dimension. We should identify our own actions that can further stated 
good governance values. We must recognize that we can act at three levels: 
- as Citizens/voters; 
- as Investors; 
- as Consumers. 
When we act, we have responsibility for the consequences of our actions. The fact that we are acting as 
consumers and investors does not excuse us from that responsibility. However, between our actions and the 
achievement of intended consequences lie a number of institutions:   
- As citizens we rely on parties, parliaments and bureaucracies to implement our collective choices.  
- As investors, we rely on advisors, trust funds, fund managers and corporations to connect our values 
with our investments.  
- As consumers, we rely on manufacturers, service providers, retailers and advertisers to inform our 
choices and deliver them. 
We empower these institutions by voting, investing and consuming. We must recognize that those 
institutions may well abuse that power and demand institutional changes to limit those changes.  
 
We should recognize that action on one front can affect action on other fronts and campaigns should press 
for action on all three fronts. We should especially seek to harness the ultimate owners of most corporations 
– superannuants.  
1. Their interests are long term and not confined to the market return on their shares. They have other 
economic interests as employees, taxpayers and parents. An action that marginally increases the return 
on their shares but raises unemployment or requires taxpayer funded clean ups or bailouts is against 
their overall economic interests. The best entrepreneurs are those who build sustainable businesses. 
The problem is that the financial intermediaries who handle superannuants’ money are driven by short 
term incentives. 
2. They also have values that go beyond economic interests. They are not only entitled to seek to further 
these through their investments but are responsible for their choices. Shareholders’ values may vary but 
this merely means that funds should differentiate themselves on the basis of the values they seek to 
further.  
3. As most superannuation funds aim for diverse investments and align shareholdings with stock market 
indices, superannuants are becoming ‘universal investors’. Any attempt by businesses to externalize 
their costs hurts another one of the superannuant’s investments – and often the superannuants 
themselves. Accordingly, the externalization of costs is not a game that superannuants can afford and 
neither they nor the funds who invest their money should be willing to play.  
4. There is a direct line between ethical and socially responsible investment by individuals, funds adopting 
and implementing the UN’s Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI) and corporate social 
responsibility initiatives such as the Global Compact.  
 
E. Peace and Security – the traditional headline issue for global governance/sustainable globalization 
Internal conflict 
In a world of sovereign states, the greatest power was that of the sovereign. The justification for such plenary 
(even despotic) power was the avoidance of civil war and preservation of social peace. For Locke, the 
sovereign was entrusted with the power for that purpose. Whatever other responsibilities are taken on by 
states, and whatever erosions of state power made some of those responsibilities difficult to discharge the 
preservation of internal peace remained central.  
 
The extent of that power (which Weber dubbed ‘a monopoly of legitimate force’) provides a temptation to 
some to abuse it for their own purposes or for the purposes of those who paid them to look the other way 
when they are engaging in illegal trafficking, money laundering and other activities. It also makes ‘state 
capture’ an attractive goal for those who wish to wield state power for their own benefit and to ensure that 
the judiciary and security services are used to persecute enemies rather than to check their own illegal 
activities. Such state capture may occur through corrupt networks gaining control of key state institutions or it 
may take the traditional form of a coup d’état (one of the most egregious forms of corruption in which 
coercive power entrusted for the protection of the state and its people is used against them – sometimes at 
the behest of outside actors). Proposals for concerted domestic and international action to deter and defeat 
coups6 have been largely ignored and some states and international organisations still see the promotion of 
coups as a legitimate even in democracies.  
 
The modern doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (‘R2P’) was proposed by the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 20017 and endorsed by the United Nations in 2005. It places the 
primary responsibility on states for the protection of their own citizens from major human rights abuses. 
However when the relevant state is unwilling or unable to do so, R2P creates a secondary responsibility on 
the broader community of states. It does so despite the long and sad history of such ‘interventions’, starting 
with those on behalf of co-religionists in the thirty years war – not least because there are now institutions 
which can authorize such action (UN Security Council, UN General Assembly under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ 
procedure or validation of the intervention by the International Court of Justice).  
 
External conflict 
R2P illustrates the inter relationship of national and global governance and how weaknesses in each 
compound weaknesses in the other. It also indicates the powers given to international agencies and the 
limited basis for establishing integrity system(s) to prevent their abuse. One of the issues that needs to be 
confronted is whether members of the UN Security Council which are entrusted with the power to authorize 
‘all necessary means’ (what would once have been called ‘war’) must exercise that power for the purposes 
for which it is given rather than for the benefit of the relevant country. Is it appropriate for some countries to 
secure the votes of security council member states through inducements? It could be argued that such 
attempts constitute the most egregious forms of corruption and that member states which offer or accept 
such inducements are not fit to take part in such decisions. Whether or not interventions are authorized by 
the UNSC or some other legitimate international authority (e.g. ICJ), such interventions involve the 
delegation of massive powers which are subject to abuse in that they may be used for purposes other than 
those for which the use of force is authorized. Even where international action involves aid and assistance, 
the large inflow of cash and highly paid foreigners can distort the local economy and provide opportunities for 
the abuse of power. Good governance, transparency, accountability and the rule of law must be built into all 
interventions to prevent corruption and to provide a model for the operation of local institutions post-
intervention. 
 
Combating terrorism 
The response to 9/11 has generally involved handing significant powers to bodies which seek to avoid 
accountability to domestic and international transparency, accountability and the rule of law. Terrorism is one 
of several problems that require co-ordinated domestic and international responses. In the absence of 
effective global integrity mechanisms such responses will fail and other countries will be reluctant to become 
involved and may do only half-heartedly.  This would be most unfortunate because such co-ordinated action 
is necessary and some of the means for combating terrorism are extremely useful for combating corruption 
and tax avoidance (especially tracing of money flows which some countries had been reluctant to implement 
before 9/11).  
 
F. Natural Resources and Energy – the honey-pot for corruption 
The opportunities for corruption in avoiding taxes or in stealing the annual revenues of government are 
significant. The opportunities for corruption in dealing with national assets are far greater – and in many 
states, the most important national assets are natural resources and energy. Extensive corruption systems 
that cross national borders may have been established to take advantage of those opportunities. These need 
to be tackled by a combination of national integrity systems, a global integrity system and sectoral integrity 
systems. As in other areas, the first step is to identify the relevant powers with a significant capacity for 
abuse and to ensure that relevant integrity systems include measures to increase the likelihood that such 
powers are used for publicly stated purposes rather than abused to transfer gains to other parties. 
 
G. Carbon and climate change – the recent headline issue for sustainable globalization 
Unlike the increasing flows of money, goods, people and ideas across national borders that constitute the 
heart of globalization, carbon flows across borders independently of human action. It is a headline issue 
because: (a) all the above-mentioned global flows have exacerbated climate change, (b) solutions involve 
global agreement on goals the creation of untried institutional mechanisms. If global warming is to be halted 
this century, total emissions have to be capped and cut and all states will have to participate in securing that 
outcome. 
 
Relationship to other issues:  
Carbon and climate changes are related to other issues considered in this conference: 
1. Peace and conflict: war makes massive contributions to carbon emissions (and individual armies are 
more expensive than collective security forces of the kind provided for in the UN Charter but never 
implemented). 
2. Poverty – how do we persuade those who have not caused the problem to refrain from the behaviours 
that made us rich? We cannot pursue means that will create poverty in other countries – let alone famine 
through the use of potentially food producing land for growing oil substitutes or creating carbon sinks; 
3. Energy is a large part of extractive industries and most energy is produced by extracted resources. 
4. Corruption will hinder any attempts to accurately measure carbon emissions and implement measures 
for their reduction.  
 
The fundamental problem – an unsustainable version of the ‘good life’ 
1. Resource-intensive, high-carbon, western lifestyles are frequently criticized as unsustainable and deeply 
unsatisfying (with little evidence of increased happiness and increased indicators of unhappiness in 
depression, works stress and suicides). However, these lifestyles are still attractive to the majority of 
westerners and to a high proportion of the developing world’s middle classes. Even if confined to the 
west such lifestyles are unsustainable: their extension to the rest of the world increases the downward 
spiral to ecological catastrophe. 
2. Since the 1970s, there have been many pleas for western nations to desist from unsustainable aspects 
of their lifestyle and more ascetic lifestyles have been advocated. While some will choose less energy 
intensive and environmentally damaging versions of the goods and services they desire, self-denial has 
rarely been widely popular among those who can indulge themselves and the numbers pursuing 
unsustainable lifestyles has increased over the last 30 years rather than decreased. 
3. In summary, the key problem is that the West has invented and proselytized an unsustainable version of 
the ‘good life’ that other countries seek to emulate. 
4. There can be no solution to climate change until we can develop sustainable conceptions of the good life 
that we in the west want to live and which others might want to live. A dialogue between east and west 
might be very instructive in imagining such conceptions of the good life. 
5. Fortunately, many of the things that human beings value most do not require huge investments of energy 
and an unsustainable use of resources – for example: companionship, conviviality, conversation. None 
of Nussbaum’s list of human values8 need break the ecological bank: life (not dying prematurely), bodily 
health, bodily integrity, pleasurable experiences/absence of pain, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, 
living with concern for other species, play, control over one’s political and material environment. 
6. Other alternatives are coercing developing countries to cap their emissions (not possible even if it were 
morally acceptable) and paying those countries to cap their emissions (self defeating while 
unsustainable images of the good life prevail because, one way or another, those being paid to live more 
sustainable lifestyles will seek the unsustainable ‘good life’). 
 
Concerns about carbon trading schemes 
While the ultimate solution to climate change is the development of low carbon lifestyles, it is important that 
economic incentives support that search. The currently favoured approach is to set a cap and then cut total 
emissions with the trading of emission rights to provide incentives to those who can most efficiently cut their 
carbon and minimize the cost   This is unsurprisingly popular in states emitting the most carbon because it 
effectively gives them a property right to emit – something that is acknowledged in the literature (‘issuing 
permits free of charge (or at low cost) explicitly recognises the property rights which emitters have had in the 
past.’9). Where an activity is shown to be harmful, it is not immediately obvious that we should create 
property rights to continue the harmful activity and to give the greatest property rights to those who have 
done the most harm.  
1. This leads to a rush to create property rights in unsustainable activity – and given to those who have 
been the worst offenders among nations and within nations. This idea is popular in west and with those 
who would operate the markets. It is unpopular with non-western countries who would be given less 
rights. Why would they agree? 
2. Giving concessions to those countries or corporations who are already engaged in the unsustainable 
activity effectively concedes a ‘right’ to engage in unsustainable activities.  
3. It also has the perverse effect of encouraging market players to look for the next unsustainable activity in 
which they can invest to benefit from ‘grand fathered’ rights.  
4. Faith in markets may be misplaced in this case. The relevant commodity (carbon) is not well understood 
and knowledge will be asymmetric – allowing market players many opportunities for arbitrage and taking 
advantage of the ignorance of those who need to access the market to continue their businesses. This 
leads to the possibility that much of the extra cost of doing business will end up in the hands of market 
players rather than consumers or producers who have to pay higher prices. There is also the possibility 
that everybody loses. New markets often get it wrong. The creators and ‘market makers’ for derivatives 
were very keen to enter into carbon trading. While many are wary of entrusting them with the contents of 
their piggy banks, it is unlikely that they will be entrusted with the future of the planet.  
5. New markets are always prone to fluctuation and profiteering from asymmetric knowledge. 
 
Revisiting carbon taxes in a new form – the ‘Carbon Added Tax’ 
1. The alternative approach involves the taxation of unsustainable activity rather than granting rights to it. I 
would suggest a ‘carbon added tax’ (CAT) to operate like a VAT. If it operates like a VAT, carbon taxes 
are passed on up the line until paid by the consumer of the relevant goods and services. The VAT 
treatment of imports means that those who keep outside the system of carbon taxes would still face the 
CAT when the goods are imported into a market within the system. It also means that the burden is on 
those countries which consume high carbon goods and services rather than those who produce them. 
2. Revenue could be returned to individuals through cuts in consumption tax (either across the Board or 
targeted in areas such as food where the poor pay more) to prevent inflationary impact while retaining a 
strong price signal. Indeed, it provides both negative and positive price signals as low carbon products 
actually decline in price (though slowly enough to avoid deflation of low carbon products). 
3. In general, we should move from taxing consumption to taxing carbon and return the proceeds to 
individual citizens – or to individuals globally through a global minimum income. Replacing consumption 
taxes with a carbon tax would massively change the incentives for reducing green house and other 
emissions without affecting inflation. 
 
H. Financial Globalization – the current headline issue for sustainable globalization 
If globalization involves the flow of people, ideas, goods and money, the last has grown most rapidly – 
indeed well in excess of the flow of goods and investment that it is supposed to support. Developing 
countries have entrusted their enormous and growing surpluses in western banks and other financial 
intermediaries. Some (such as East Timor) have been pressed by western run multi-laterals to entrust the 
proceeds of extractive industries in Wall St on the basis that it was less likely to be eroded by corruption.10   
 
The amounts entrusted to such intermediaries in the US and elsewhere on the basis that they would be 
invested on a secure and conservative basis were unprecedented. It now appears that entrusted powers 
over vast sums of money were abused for personal gain. Many within financial intermediaries have played 
with that money in ways that maximized their fees while increasing the risks to their investors. The ratings 
practices were scandalous and incredibly insulting to well run businesses and governments whose risk was 
far less than 110 percent non-recourse mortgages on inflated values to NINJA borrowers (no income, no job, 
no assets). The fact that their risk models were based on the probabilities of individual defaults and ignored 
the possibility of an overall decline in property markets is merely more evidence of incompetence, negligence 
and ‘arrogance beyond their means’. Once such ratings could be secured, the signing up of mortgagees, the 
packaging of those loans, their rating and their sale to local citizens and foreigners looks like a well oiled 
‘corruption system’. Even though they did not see themselves as corrupt, several parties were maximizing 
their fees while squandering profits at the expense of those who entrusted them with their funds. The 
unedifying subsequent sharp shift from greed to blind panic only adds to the contempt that so many have 
engendered.  
 
This does not mean that banks should not be rescued. The fact that they were poorly run is not the point. If 
they had been well run, they would not need to be rescued. Rescues are instigated to protect the wider 
economy, confidence and depositors who were not accepting suspiciously high rates – while seeking to 
ensure that the owners and managers of such banks remain as exposed as possible to the consequences of 
their mistakes.  
 
Neither does this mean that all participants acted unethically or illegally. However, if confidence in the 
international financial system is to be restored in the long term, and if the proceeds of developing country 
surpluses and western superannuation are to continue to be entrusted with intermediaries for investment in 
the globalized economy – thereby supporting sustainable globalization rather than undermining it, then, this 
can only happen if there is a full investigation of what went wrong and options for the establishment of 
adequate financial integrity systems are debated, selected and implemented as part of the Global Integrity 
System. Such an investigation will have to include members of developing as well as developed countries 
and be supported by the work of international researchers, NGOs and international organizations. In this 
process the Equator Principles, the UN Global Compact, the UN Principles of Responsible Investment will 
need to be reconsidered and implemented. 
 
In reforming the international financial system, we should set the goal of ensuring that those who are 
entrusted with investing funds for others do not abuse that entrusted power to increase their wealth at the 
expense of those for whom they invest. At the same time, we should set the international banking system the 
goal of establishing a regime that is sufficiently transparent so that no rational corrupt official or tax avoider 
would put his money in an offshore bank. This author has long argued that this is the single most important 
contribution that developed nations can make to the reduction of corruption in developing nations. While 
some developed nations had resisted such a goal, 9/11 has stimulated the development of relevant tools. 
 
Conclusion and application to the conference deliberations 
The IACC’s target is corruption – the abuse of entrusted power personal gain or other benefits to the power 
holder’s family, associates or party. Over the years, the international anti-corruption movement has come to 
recognize that this is a subsidiary goal to the primary goal of integrity, the use of entrusted power for publicly 
justified purposes. Like most others concerned with governance in a world of sovereign states, the 
movement initially concentrated on the exercise and potential abuse of power by public officials of sovereign 
states and those who seek to induce them to abuse that power. Even if the bribers were foreign, the 
problems were essentially national and solutions were seen to lie in ‘national integrity systems’. However, 
the forces of globalization and deregulation have weakened sovereign states and ensured that there are 
many other loci of power which may be exercised with integrity or corruptly. While corruption by state officials 
acting within their territorial boundaries is a contributing factor to most  problems considered by IACC 13, the 
magnitude of those problems would be far less if corruption was limited to those officials. Corruption systems 
will generally involve national and international actors and be far more damaging for that reason.  
 
It is recommended that the international anti-corruption movement broadens its areas of concern to include 
the powers of institutional actors who operate internationally or trans-nationally, identify the justified uses of 
those powers and consider the global operation of corruption systems and the kind of global integrity system 
that is needed to secure a reasonable chance that those powers are used for those justified purposes. 
 
This approach should assist this conference achieve its key objectives and this paper has sought to provide 
some material and methodology for addressing those objectives.  
 
The first objective of this conference is to ‘identify the links between corruption and human security, climate 
change, natural resources governance and energy security’. This paper suggests a prior question: what 
should be the goals of sustainable globalization (i.e. what do we want sustainable globalization to sustain?). 
The three areas mentioned are undoubtedly among those goals but it is important that other goals be 
considered in prioritizing our own actions and in designing the Global Integrity System. Since the Agenda of 
this conference was set, the problems within the international financial system have become both more 
evident and more acute. Having added a fourth area, this paper has suggested a methodology for 
establishing such links and given several examples.   
 
In all cases, we should look to those who have been, or will be, entrusted with power to secure the relevant 
goal. For peace and security, we look to the national security forces that are supposed to preserve the 
security of individuals and communities but whose abuse of that power may constitute the greatest threat to 
the security, well being and human rights of those they are supposed to protect – from police running 
protection rackets to coups run by generals, colonels and even the odd flight lieutenant or master sergeant. 
The extra powers given to, or taken by, security forces after 9/11 provide other potential sources of abuse.  
Internationally, the UN Security Council has enormous power to act to preserve or restore peace but it does 
so on the basis of the interests of those who run their governments. When delegating power and authority to 
member states to use force, the UN has only recently started to curb abuses by individual members of 
intervention forces and has been able to do little to avoid the abuse of the member states.   
 
In natural resources and energy, the holders of entrusted power are the government officials (and sometimes 
tribal elders) who authorize the search for and extraction of natural resources, the corporations who do the 
extraction, the bankers who finance it and, in some cases, those who provide security for the relevant 
industries.  In all too many countries, those powers have been the subject of massive abuse. In banking, the 
holders of entrusted power are the various intermediaries with whom individual investors entrust their funds. 
In climate change, similar intermediaries will be entrusted with the role of making the markets work – while 
on the ground officials will have to be entrusted with determining whether carbon emitting or carbon 
absorbing activities are actually being carried out. 
  
This is not an exhaustive list of those with entrusted power in the relevant areas but it is suggested that the 
relevant sessions consider what powers are or will be entrusted and where the greatest risk of corrupt 
exercise of those powers lies. As in all risk analysis, it should take into account the likelihood and severity of 
the risk (with the latter being determined by the effect on poverty, inequality and human rights referred to in 
the second objective. 
 
The second, third and fourth objectives are to: ‘raise awareness and facilitate the design of strategies to 
address these links and their effects on poverty, inequality and human rights abuses’; ‘take stock of anti-
corruption best practices that address or are necessary to address the above mentioned challenges’; and 
‘facilitate strategy design, networking and partnership building to address corruption in the areas of 
sustainable development, human security, climate change, natural resource management and energy 
security.’ 
 
These objectives will involve a great deal of detailed thought by the assembled experts.  However, this paper 
does suggest some directions for this work:  
- learning from national strategies that have worked (bearing in mind some of the lessons from 
successful international campaigns from Amnesty International to Greenpeace as well as TI); 
- developing sectoral integrity systems and an overall global integrity system to raise integrity and 
combat corruption through the combination of ethical standard setting, legal regulation and 
institutional reform – with coalitions of leaders to drive the creation of that system; 
- co-ordinating the actions of citizens, consumers and investors to press governments and 
corporations to address the risks identified and to press for the development and later refinement of 
the suggested global integrity system. 
 
Good luck with your deliberations, the planet depends on you. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX: GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Individuals and Institutions 
Despite western emphasis on individuals, we live our lives largely in, and through, the institutions in which 
we work, play, and procreate. Even when we try to act like ‘individuals’, our lives are played out in an 
environment characterised by powerful institutions. Institutions and their governance are generally part of our 
most pressing problems (including those relating to national research priorities). Institutions are also almost 
invariably a key part of solutions to those problems – whether the institutions are non-government 
organisations (NGOs), corporations, industry groups, regulators, government agencies, regional bodies or 
international agencies.  
 
Governance disciplines 
The importance of good institutional governance is recognised by many disciplines which might make a 
contribution to institutional governance and reform. The problem is not that it is ignored: the problem is that 
each discipline has a strongly theorised but limited conception of institutions, which colours and structures 
their view of the nature of institutional problems and the best means for addressing them. For example, 
lawyers look at institutions and see sets of formal norms, ethicists see informal norms and the values the 
institution claims to further, economists see incentives and disincentives, political scientists see power 
relations, social psychologists see complex webs of interpersonal and group relationships, and management 
theorists see structures and systems. Accordingly, the problems are seen in the deficiency of laws, ethical 
standards, incentives etc. and the solutions are seen as lying in remedying those deficiencies. All these 
partial insights into institutions and their problems are important and any solution that ignores them is likely 
to fail. However, as proffered solutions tend to be developed from only one disciplinary perspective, they are 
necessarily limited, perhaps over-emphasising legislative solutions or the impact of economic incentives. 
 
Governance 
There are many different definitions of governance. However, at their base, they refer to the way that 
decisions are made within an organisation – whether a particular corporation, NGO, or government agency 
OR within government as a whole.  
 
Good Governance 
A narrow definition might see good governance in terms of institutional integrity (see above). However, I 
would prefer to see it as governance subject to ‘good governance values’. Such values include integrity and 
accountability but are not confined to these values. For governments such values would include: 
- democracy; 
- respect for human rights and liberties; 
- adherence to the rule of law; 
- citizenship; 
- respect for the environment. 
For corporations, good governance values would include: 
- adherence to the rule of law; 
- adherence to the corporations own constitution; 
- respect for customers, consumers and members of the communities in which it operates.  
 
The above values are stated in English and in western terms. In saying that, I seek to avoid cultural 
relativism and claims to universal values. Values are universal only when stated in their most general terms. 
Good governance values (and bad governance values) can be found in all cultures and traditions. The good 
governance values are ‘congruent’ rather than ‘identical’ and arise in particular historical and social 
circumstances that provide important nuances that can be ‘lost in translation’. I argue that: 
• All long standing cultures deal with major social issues and provide a range of answers reflecting 
different interpretations of its ideals. 
• During the 20th century, western culture produced a range of interpretations ranging from Nazism to 
the inclusive, tolerant versions of liberal democracy. 
• Other cultures are likely to generate a similar range of answers from the vicious to the sublime. 
• Most cultures will include values that are very similar to western liberal-democratic values. 
• However, those values will not be identical to western values but will be nuanced and influenced by 
the context in which they arose. 
• Much can be learnt from comparing the rich and nuanced variations. 
• Governance reforms should be based on the local versions of good governance for three reasons: 
1. It avoids giving a ‘free hit’ to the opponents of reform who would otherwise portray governance 
reform as a western import when in fact it is grounded in local culture. 
2. Good governance will take a firmer root if based on local versions of good governance.  
3. The good governance values will be more easily recognizable by the relevant population. 
 
National Integrity Systems 
While it is now fashionable to see national integrity systems as the answer to corruption, this is a relatively 
recent development. When corruption scandals strike, one of three responses results – tougher laws, ethical 
standard setting or institutional reform. Each response has its weaknesses and strengths but is unlikely to be 
effective by itself. If a new law, ethical code or new institution is successful, it is because it supports or is 
supported by other measures already in place. Nevertheless, the apparent success of a particular measure 
in one jurisdiction may lead some to see a panacea or ‘silver bullet’. During the 1980s, the most common 
response to corruption was the creation of a single, very powerful, anti-corruption agency along the lines of 
the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). However, this model was criticized for 
placing too much reliance on a dangerously powerful, single institution. The NIS does not see the answer to 
corruption in a single institution, let alone a single law, but rather in the institutionalisation of integrity through 
a number of agencies, laws, practices and ethical codes.  
 
This approach has been given various names including an ‘ethics regime’ (Sampford 1991), an ‘integrity 
system’ (TI 1996) and an ‘ethics infrastructure’ (OECD 1997), but the term with the widest currency is TI’s 
‘national integrity system’. 
 
Based on this, a ‘National Integrity System’ is a term that encapsulates the interconnecting institutions, laws, 
procedures, practices and attitudes that promote integrity and reduce the likelihood of corruption in public 
life. 
 
Given that integrity is the opposite of corruption, one may wonder whether it matters whether it is called an 
integrity system or an anti-corruption system. However, the distinction is an important one. Integrity systems 
are not built around the negative goal of limiting corruption but the positive goal of maximising integrity. The 
negative goal is necessarily implied by the positive one – if power is to be used in officially sanctioned ways, 
it should not be abused by being diverted to other ends. It is not enough to avoid government corruption (if 
that were our only goal, it would be achieved by abolishing government!). Institutions need to achieve the 
goals set for them by the people’s representatives.  
 
In placing power in the hands of individuals or groups, human communities are taking a risk — that the 
benefits to be gained from use for the justified purposes of the institution outweigh the risks of its abuse. 
Integrity systems are designed to increase the likelihood of the benefit of the intended use of power and 
reduce the risk of the abuse.  
 
Integrity and Corruption 
It is interesting that the OECD’s preferred term is not ‘anti-corruption infrastructure’ and TI, despite its central 
and fundamental focus, does not call it an ‘anti-corruption system’. This raises the question of what is meant 
by ‘integrity’ (or for the OECD, what is meant by ‘ethics’).  
 
Integrity and corruption are conceptually linked terms – with one the obverse of the other. TI defines 
corruption as the ‘misuse of entrusted power for private benefit’. By contrast, integrity is ‘the use of public 
power for officially endorsed and publicly justified purposes’. The latter definition is primary because you 
cannot know what is an abuse if you do not know what the correct ‘use’ is. The form of official endorsement 
will vary from system to system but, in a democracy, the officially endorsed uses of public power are those 
set by the elected government and legislature. Indeed, democratic competition is about differing views as to 
how public power should be used for the benefit of citizens.  
 
Accountability 
Officials are accountable if they are required to demonstrate that they have used their power in officially 
approved ways. In National Integrity Systems, it is common for agencies to be ‘mutually accountable’ rather 
than hierarchically accountable. 
 
Institutional Integrity 
Where organisations use their power for publicly stated and officially authorized purposes they exhibit 
‘institutional integrity’. This is analogous to individual integrity. An individual has integrity if they are true to 
their principles and do what they say they will. Institutions have integrity if they operate to further the goals 
that are publicly set by democratically elected governments.  
 
Individual and Institutional Ethics 
This is consistent with, and is underpinned by, our approach to ethics. We see ethics acting as the 
coordinating force because it asks fundamental values questions. For many ethicists, the fundamental 
ethical question that individuals face is ‘how should I lead my life?’  For me, ethics is about asking hard 
questions about your values, giving honest and public answers and living by them. If we do, we have 
‘integrity’. This is as true of institutions as it is of individuals. 
 
As I see it, members and of institutions face similar questions:  
 How should we lead our lives together? 
 What is the institution FOR? 
 On what basis can we justify the power and authority that we are given despite the fact that there is, as 
in all concentrations of power, a risk of abuse? 
 What values does it further and should we further it in order to justify the power and authority given to us 
and/or tolerated by the community we claim to serve? 
 
Transparency  
Transparency is a key process value in the practice of ethics and the achievement of integrity (and hence 
countering corruption), good governance, integrity systems and necessary for accountability. 
 
Transparency involves publicly stating the values we claim to further in both general and specific terms, the 
means we are taking to achieve them and the extent to which they have been achieved. This is critical to 
personal ethics and allows us to be ‘true to ourselves’. It is particularly important in institutional ethics to 
ensure that organizations think about where they are going, how they are going to get there and what 
progress they are making. Transparency is an essential part of the operation of integrity systems – both of 
the agencies and institutions monitored and the agencies and institutions undertaking the monitoring. 
 
This might appear to be an imperialistic statement about one governance value. However, similar stories 
can, and often are, told about other values. At times ‘liberty’, ‘human rights’, ‘the rule of law’, ‘democracy’ 
and, nowadays, ‘sustainability’. What the statement above actually sets out is the interconnectedness of 
governance values in theory as well as in the practice of national integrity systems.  
 
Transparency does not mean that all information is provided to everybody about everything. The revelation 
of some information would totally compromise institutional integrity and the ability of institutions to do their 
jobs as well as compromising important human rights. Public revelation of those suspected of corruption 
would both tarnish the innocent and protect the guilty. Revelation of whistleblowers can put lives at risk as 
well. The details of what information particular kinds of institutions provide to their members and to those 
they affect may need to be carefully worked out, balancing and respecting a range of important values. 
However, the above schema provides a clear guide. The focus of transparency demands and the information 
that is scrutinized should concentrate on claims about values an institution seeks to further, its means for 
achieving them, the risks of non-achievement especially through the abuse of power and the extent to which 
those values are being achieved.  
 
However, there is a broader argument for transparency. Where institutions are established to serve a 
particular community (governments to serve citizens and joint stock companies to their ultimate owners), the 
presumption must be that the information belongs to the citizens and stock holders and that the information 
should be readily available to any one of those who want it. It is up to the government or corporation to justify 
to its citizens/owners that it is in their interests that such information is not available. Such arguments can be 
made based on national security or competitive advantage. However, that case has to be made and 
accepted by the citizens and ultimate owners respectively.  
 
Where an organization’s claim to benefit a wider group than its members is a key part of its pitch for the 
privileges that it enjoys (e.g. the claim that the privileges of incorporation further broader societal goals such 
as prosperity, diversity and liberty), transparency as to those values, means, risks and achievements is also 
justified. 
 
How does globalization affect these values 
Some governance values need major work in a globalized world – especially citizenship and democracy, 
terms which migrated from the city states of antiquity to much larger entities in the modern era. The 
competing meanings of ‘equality’ become even more perplexing when they move outside the nation state to 
a globalized world.  
 
Values such as the rule of law, liberty, human rights and transparency do not need much development but 
their application is wider and the institutions and integrity systems that will achieve them will look very 
different.  
Introduction: The Walls Came Tumbling Down 
In 1961, the East German government erected what they claimed was an anti-capitalist barricade.  In 1989, 
this barricade was dismantled by those whom it was supposed to keep apart: the forces it was intended to 
contain had overwhelmed it. In the aftermath, the victims of Stalinist oppression and the planned economy 
opted for radical change. Some might have hoped that they would intellectually march resolutely westwards 
towards the forms of social democracy that had proven so successful in their nearest neighbours – 
Scandinavia, Germany and Austria – and stop when they had reached a point on the political spectrum with 
which they felt comfortable, and which worked for them. Unfortunately, they went to the opposite end of 
political economy. That choice was celebrated by those theorists who wanted our own countries to move in 
the same direction. Eastern Europe suffered a decline of 50% in its GDP.   
Much earlier in 1653, Peter Stuyvesant had erected an earth and wooden wall to protect the 
westernmost settlement of a great commercial nation from those they imagined to be barbarians.  In 1699 
Stuyvesant’s barrier was dismantled by the British, who replaced it with a street named after the wall. So it 
came to be that one of the most inconsequential walls in history became one of history’s most famous 
streets.  I am not sure if the Dutch had left some tulip bulbs on either side of the wall, perhaps as a reminder 
of capitalism’s first bubble, and an inspiration to later bubbles. However, many of the victims of the latest 
burst bubble are pretty keen to tear down that Wall.1 As in 1989, they want to take action against the 
guardians of the system that failed them. And the more they suffer, the more likely it is that they will demand 
radical change, and the more likely that the resulting change will go too far – as seems to have been the 
case in Eastern Europe after the terminal crisis of communism, and in the majority of democracies that fell in 
the dozen years following the Great Crash.1  The current reaction is so strong that some are even wondering 
what role there will be for markets.  I was invited to address a conference in the EU Parliament last 
November on the topic ‘Capitalism: Quo Vadis?’, where I apologized to the international audience that the 
topic was posed in a dead European language because the answer to this question is not going to be 
determined by the west alone.  The problems we have been addressing emerged in the west and have 
affected the rest. However, the answers will not come, solely from the west, and may even come primarily 
from the south and the east. 
 
W[h]ither Capitalism? 
At that conference I suggested that the best literal translation was ‘Whither capitalism?’, but a freer and more 
appropriate definition would be ‘Wither capitalism?’  In answer to the question, ‘Capitalism – quo vadis?’ 
three broad answers have been propounded. Some have said ‘nowhere’, some have said ‘everywhere’ and 
others have suggested that capitalism has a vital but defined role within a larger ethical order.  During the 
1930s, statists of the right and anarchists of the left said that capitalism had nowhere to go. It was left to the 
American social democrats, in the end, to save capitalism from itself.  In the 1970s, the statists of the left 
said that capitalism had nowhere to go. However, the anarchists of the right saw it as going everywhere; in 
fact, some of them started to say how superior markets were to democracy. The social democrats were the 
ones who saw capitalism playing a vital role in a larger order – with clear spaces for both the democracy of 
the dollar and the democracy of the vote. Some also recognized the need to police the boundary lest those 
with dollars buy votes or government action (a common form of ‘public private partnership’ that some call 
‘corruption’).  From 1980 to 2008, the ‘everywhere’ option seemed to be very popular, and it’s interesting 
how a number of extremists from the left became extremists for the right.  A couple of the quite famous ones 
have decided to start moving backwards: it could well be that they are third time lucky. Yet I suggest we seek 
counsel elsewhere, and look to the role of values to save capitalism from itself a second time, and also to let 
us all glean a better understanding of the proper place of capitalism. I was profoundly unimpressed in 1989 
that Francis Fukuyama should without irony herald the failure of the last ideology which proclaimed the end 
of history only to make a similar claim for his own.  At the time, some of us had noticed a few problems with 
capitalism, and it is a pity that the decision by Gorbachev to end the cold war and to attempt gradual change 
towards more liberal democratic models led us to ignore those clear problems.  I maintained then that there 
would be a role for markets, and that the extremism of statists or anarchists of the left or right had been a 
large part of the political and economic upheavals of the twentieth century, offering no prospects for solving 
problems in the twenty-first century. We should recognize the dynamic power of markets, which allow us to 
trade what we have for what we would prefer, but also recognise that this is one element in an effective order 
that serves the interests of the community.  
 
Adam Smith’s Dinner and the Missing Variable 
Adam Smith famously said:  
‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, 
but from their regard to their own self-interest.’   
 
We might equally say that it is not the malevolence of the mortgage broker who writes the NINJA loan, or the 
ratings agency that anoints it AAA. It is not the malevolence of the arms manufacturer that invents the cluster 
bomb or the polluter who destroys the planet. It is, rather, from their regard to their own self-interest.   
Self-interest is an important motivation, but there are some other critical variables or preconditions 
determining, for instance, whether self interest puts food on our plantation timber table, or cluster bombs in 
an overheated and flood prone backyard that has been repossessed by a zombie bank.  The key questions 
is: what are those other variables, and why and how has their variation dealt so much damage so quickly?  
As we all know, this is the 250th anniversary of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, the work Adam Smith 
regarded as his most important, and which provided the essential grounding for his Wealth of Nations. The 
former is now seen primarily to concern moral philosophy and the latter economics, so that some might say 
moral philosophy or ethics is prior to and more important than economics, and constitutes the relevant 
variable. But Smith would not have said that. He and other contempories lived before the separation of 
disciplines and, like Bentham, Smith would have seen little point in separating the modern disciplines of law, 
ethics, politics and economics, whose separate formation post-dates their work and their insights.  Two and 
a half centuries later, with the modern separation of disciplines now so broad, what might we say about 
Smith’s missing variable? 
 Smith’s eighteenth century petit bourgeoisie did business with regard to their own self-interest (rather 
than, say, their customers’ interest or the greater good), but precisely what self-interest signified to them – 
and to him – can only be understood from an overarching view of the specific institutional landscape in which 
they found themselves.  This kind of overarching understanding – or the attempt at it – seems by and large 
to have been missing from contemporary academic debate. The study of institutions, their problems and 
solutions, what they are and what they mean, is divided into strongly theorised but limited discipline-specific 
fields, which can easily aggravate any nascent contemporary misunderstanding of the thrust of Smith’s 
observation. Each discipline provides vital yet severely limited insights into the institutional settings in which 
putatively self-interested agents go about their everyday business.  Our missing variable concerns the 
institutional settings in which people live, and in which they interact with one another – sometimes, as in 
Smith’s example, through the medium of markets. Yet how do we best conceive of and govern these 
intermediary institutions, given the current interdisciplinary (and intra-disciplinary) proliferation of theoretical 
approaches to institutional governance?  The question is especially pressing if our aims include ameliorating 
and preventing the kinds of system-wide failures – the current world economic crisis furnishes a vivid 
example – that have occasionally spilled over and devastated butchers, brewers, bakers and their customers 
alike.  
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